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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
cilitate the judicial process and to avoid uncertainty as to
the proper rules of procedure within the state-court system1 8
Such uncertainty is not avoided when the impression is per-
mitted to prevail that the rules of procedure previously hav-
ing their sanction in legislative enactment are now sanctioned
as rules of the Supreme Court, only to discover that the court
"amends its own 'rules" by declaring legislation of long
standing unconstitutional.
RENT CONTROL
NECESSITY OF COMPLYING WITH RENT REGULATIONS
Suit by tenant against landlord for rent-overcharge penalty.
D attempted to show he had given P the required notice of
increase and that the new rent was justified as not being
more than P collected for the premises from subtenants.
Judgment for P. Held: Affirmed. Martino v. Hotzworth,
158 F.(2d) 845 (C.C.A. 8th, 1947).
This case illustrates the requirement for strict compli-
ance with the Maximum Rent Regulations. There are a few
exceptions,' but mere "substantial performance" is ordinarily
inadequate.2 The general rule applies to the popularly termed
"rent decontrol" for transient rooms.3 Before the landlord
can possibly qualify for decontrol, he must first file a supple-
mental registration statement so the Rent Director can classi-
which could be and was held to have been waived in that case,
without reference to the constitutionality of the statute.
18. The responsibility of the court seems increasingly important where
the legislature has actually abandoned the procedural field and
corrective measures are possible only through court rules. For
a discussion of the general theories of the rule-making power, see
1 Sutherland, "Statutory Construction" (3rd ed. 1943) § 226.
1. Hotel Enterprise v. Porter, 157 F.(2d) 690 (Ct. Em. App., 1946)
(illness of manager excused late application for rent adjustment) ;
Peters v. Porter, 157 F. (2d) 186 (Ct. Em. App., 1946) (require-
ment of re-registration after remodeling so concealed in the lan-
guage of the regulations that they were not apparent to landlord
of reasonable intelligence).
2. Ambassador Ap'ts. v. Porter, 157 F.(2d) 774 (Ct. Em. App.,
1946) (foreign residence and ignorance of procedural regulations
of persons controlling corporate landlord held no excuse) ; Bowles
v. Meyers, 149 F.(2d) 440 (C.C.A. 4th, 1945) mere belief that
the order is invalid does not excuse).
3. Rent Regulations for Transient Hotels, Residential Hotels, Room-
ing Houses and Motor Courts, Amend. 102, 12 Fed. Reg. 395 (Jan.
18, 1947).
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fy his premises ;4 only then may he make the required appli-
cation under the decontrol order. A landlord is not eligible
to be considered for decontrol until both steps have been tak-
en. An increase in rent without authorization is a violation
of the regulations.5
TORTS
INDEPENDENT INTERVENING CAUSE
P was riding in an automobile driven by D when it
overturned. No one was injured, and the passengers of the
car immediately set about to right the car. While assisting,
P cut his wrist on broken window glass, for which injury
he brought suit. D was found negligent in operating the
automobile and liable for P's injuries. Held: Affirined,
P's act was the normal response to the stimulus of the sit-
uation created by D's negligence and not a superseding cause
which would relieve D of liability. Hatch v. Smail, 23 N.W.
(2d) 460 (Wis. 1946).
In the principal case, D claimed that his negligence was
not the proximate cause of the injury,' but that P's voluntary
act in helping to right the car was an independent interven-
ing force which cut off the chain of causation from D's
negligence, and set in movement a new chain.2 But the chain
4. 11 Fed. Reg. 13038 (Nov. 2, 1946). Rooms are to be classified
as transient hotel, residential hotel, rooming house and motor
court. Only those classed as transient hotel and motor court
room are eligible for decontrol .
5. Wilfully raising rent without first qualifying may be criminal
violation of the Emergency Price Control Act, 50 U.S.C.A. (App.)
§901 et seq. ( ). Wilton v. U.S., 156 F.(2d) 433 (C.C.A. 4th
1946).
1. In determining proximate cause, the "substantial factor" test has
been stressed in Indiana in recent years, Swanson v. Slagel, 212
Ind. 394, 8 N.E. (2d) 993 (1937); the courts often speak in terms
of "material contribution", "direct cause" or "efficient cause",
Earl v. Porter, 112 Ind. App. 71, 40 N.E.(2d) 381 (1942;
Cousins v. Glassburn, 216 Ind. 431, 24 N.E.(2d) 1013 (1940);
Columbia Creosoting Co. v. Beard, 52 Ind. App. 260, 99 N.E.
823 (1912); See Harper, "Development in the Law of Torts"
(1946) .21 Ind. L.J. 447,453. Foreseeability is an essential element
of proximate cause in Indiana, see Dalton Foundries v. Jeffries,
114 Ind. App. 271,283, 51 N.E.(2d) 13,18 (1943); For a dis-
cussion of the use of foreseeability in determining proximate
cause, see Harper, supra at 455.
2. An intervening cause is one not produced by prior negligence,
but independent of it, which interrupts the course of events so
as to produce a result different from the one that could have
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